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I. INTRODUCTION
O n September 22, 1986, the Seventh Circuit of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals announced that the rules "designed to discourage ground-
less litigation are being and will continue to be enforced in this circuit to
the hilt."1 To make its message perfectly clear, it further proclaimed,
"[l]awyers practicing in the Seventh Circuit, take heed!"2 In the case
carrying this message, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint but remanded the case for an award
of attorneys' fees incurred by the defendant in both the district court and
the appellate court, relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, as
amended in August 1983. 3
* Mr. Baron is an Assistant Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law at
Houston. He earned his B.S. degree (1973) and his J.D. degree (1976) from the University
of Missouri at Columbia.
The author wishes to thank Monica Ortale and Franda Blaylock for their assistance.
Dreis & Krump Mfg. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir.
1986)(emphasis added).
2 Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
8 Id. at 255-56.
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On October 9, 1986, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered a
decision reversing the imposition of sanctions levied by the district court
against a major national law firm.4 The lawyer in question had charac-
terized an argument as "warranted by existing law" as opposed to char-
acterizing the argument as calling for the "extension, modification or
reversal of existing law."5 The lawyer had also relied on a case which was
questionable in the light of subsequent cases which the district court
concluded were directly adverse, were not disclosed by the lawyer, and
should have been discovered by the lawyer had he shepardized the case he
relied on.6 Observing that litigation expenses must have already exceeded
the amount of the sanctions "many times over," the appellate court noted
that the district court had complicated the legal process by its inappro-
priate use of Rule 11 and unnecessarily consumed resources of time,
energy, and money, which are the resources to be protected by the federal
rules.7
Twice during the summer of 1986, the Fifth Circuit not only upheld
Rule 11 sanctions by a trial court, but also awarded additional sanctions
for the persistence of the frivolous arguments in the appellate court.8
On May 23, 1986, the Second Circuit reversed the award of $4012 in
sanctions imposed by the district court for the plaintiffs failure to make
reasonable inquiry into the jurisdictional basis of the plaintiffs action. 9
The appellate court found the jurisdictional question to be quite compli-
cated and an inappropriate case for sanctions, 10 re-stating its previously
declared position that Rule 11 should not be used to "stifle the enthusi-
asm or chill the creativity that is the very lifeblood of the law.""
Are the circuits divided? No. As will be demonstrated, there is no real
disagreement among the circuits. The sampling of cases given above is
designed to attract the reader's interest, to illustrate the range of
dispositions, and to introduce a sampling of the relevant criteria used
by the courts in analyzing Rule 11 cases. As a matter of fact, the
Ninth Circuit, which is depicted in the text above for its October 9, 1986
opinion reversing the imposition of sanctions, did itself administer a
4 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
5 Id. at 1539.
6 Id. at 1542. The subsequent authorities in Shepard's were identified as "distinguish-
ing" Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp..
Id. at 1541.
' In re Ginther, 791 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1986); Barrios v. Pelham Marine, Inc., 796 F.2d
128 (5th Cir. 1986).
' Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1986).
10 Id. at 1012-14.
' Id. at 1014.
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double dose of sanctions by awarding additional attorneys' fees on appeal
in another case decided eighteen days later.12
The federal courts have become overwhelmed with litigation over Rule
11 sanctions. It was recently observed that "literally hundreds of pub-
lished opinions have appeared in the Federal Supplement and Federal
Rules Decisions" reporters on Rule 11 sanctions. 13 Comparatively fewer
decisions have as yet "percolated up to the courts of appeals." 14 Yet, the
appellate courts have taken an active role, and litigation of issues under
amended Rule 11 is now in its heyday.
Since the role of the district courts in administering Rule 11 sanctions
can only be given proper perspective by viewing it in the light of the
controls placed in force by the appellate courts, the goal of this manu-
script is to capture the present state of the law governing Rule 11
sanctions, as prescribed by the federal courts of appeals, and to highlight
the differences, where appropriate, in the approaches taken by the
various circuits. Additionally this manuscript categorizes the instances
where the district courts have inappropriately imposed sanctions.
II. THE ESSENCE OF AMENDED RULE 11
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in August
of 1983, provides in pertinent part as follows:
Every pleading, motion or other paper of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in
his individual name, whose address shall be stated. . . .The
signature of an attorney... constitutes a certificate by him that
he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation .... If a pleading,
motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the Court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
12 MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986)(MGIC's cause of
action did not improve with age; the complaint was frivolous as was the appeal).
13 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir. 1986).
14 Id.
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A. The Objective Quality of the Standard
The 1983 amendments were designed to create an affirmative duty of
investigation both as to the law and the facts prior to the filing of papers
in federal court. Accordingly, an objective standard of reasonableness was
created with the intention that a greater range of circumstances would
trigger a violation of the amended Rule 11.15 Under the prior rule,
sanctions were appropriate only for a willful violation or what has been
described as subjective bad faith. 16
The amended rule clearly imposes an affirmative duty on counsel to
study the law. It has been said that "an empty head but a pure heart is
no defense" 17 and that "subjective good faith no longer provides the safe
harbor it once did.' ' 8
The Ninth Circuit has further elaborated its view of the "reasonable
inquiry" requirement of Rule 11 as follows:
A good faith belief in the merit of a legal argument is an objective
condition which a competent attorney attains only after "reason-
able inquiry." Such inquiry is that amount of examination into
the facts and legal research which is reasonable under the
circumstances of the case. Of course, the conclusion drawn from
the research undertaken must itself be defensible. Extended
research alone will not save a claim that is without legal or
factual merit from the penalty of sanctions.19
The Second Circuit has recognized violations of amended Rule 11,
using language which describes the asserted claim in situations where "it
is patently clear" that it has "absolutely no chance of success. '20
The Fifth Circuit has used language which describes the rule's require-
ment as one demanding that the assertion be "based on a plausible view
of the law."'2
1
An interesting question is whether or not an attorney who indeed acts
in bad faith but who files a paper which is objectively reasonable is
subject to Rule 11 sanctions. In other words, if bad faith is shown to exist,
" Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp., 801 F.2d at 1536 (citing Advisory Committee Note, 97
F.R.D. 165, 198-99 (1983)).
16 Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986); Eastway Constr.
Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1985).
17 Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.) cert. denied 107 S. Ct. 181 (1986).
's Eastway Constr. Corp., 762 F.2d at 253.
19 American Metal Prod., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local 104, 794 F.2d
1452, 1458 (9th Cir. 1986)(quoting Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831).
20 Eastway Constr. Co., 762 F.2d at 254; Norris v. Grosvenor Mktg. Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281,
1288 (2d Cir. 1986)(emphasis added).
21 Davis v. Veslan Enter., 765 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1985)(emphasis original). See also
Southern Leasing Partners, Ltd. v. McMullan, 801 F.2d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 1986)("Simply
put, a lawyer must have a basis for his pleading").
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need further inquiry be made as to whether or not the belief is objectively
reasonable? The Fifth Circuit has upheld sanctions based on a finding of
"bad faith" by the district court22 and has described the amended Rule 11
as requiring both subjective good faith and objective reasonableness. 23
The opposing view has been described, but not fully adopted, by the
Ninth Circuit in posing the question, "may an attorney be sanctioned for
doing what the law allows, if the attorney's motive for doing so is
improper?" 24 Under the amended rule the "improper purpose" clause is
coupled with the "well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law"
clause by the conjunction "and." Arguably the attorney's signature is an
independent certification of both provisions.25 Nonetheless the Ninth
Circuit did hold that a defendant is not "harassed" (one such "improper
purpose" under amended Rule 11) by the filing of a complaint if the
complaint is one which is "well-grounded in fact and warranted by
existing law," despite prior participation by the same parties in a related
state court action. The court left open the question of whether or not the
filing of excessive motions, each well-grounded in fact and law, may be
sanctionable as harassment.26
The Fourth Circuit has upheld Rule 11 sanctions imposed by the district
court against the plaintiff who filed a motion solely for the purpose of
seeing whether or not the defendant would oppose it.27 The lower court's
action was upheld solely on the "improper purpose" finding with no dis-
cussion as to whether or not the motion was well-grounded in fact and
warranted by existing law. 28
B. The Nature of the Conduct Subject to Sanctions
Rule 11 requires that "every pleading, motion, and other paper" be
signed by the attorney. That signature "constitutes a certificate" by the
attorney. Sanctions are available when the "pleading, motion or other
paper" is signed in violation of the rule.
Initially it should be observed and has been held that Rule 11 applies
only to the initial signing of the "pleading, motion, or other paper" and is
not appropriate to test the conduct of the attorney at all stages of a
22 Davis, 765 F.2d at 497.
23 Stites v. I.R.S., 793 F.2d 618, 620 (5th Cir. 1986)("Thus, in addition to a subjective,
good faith belief that the pleading is well-founded in both fact and law, FED. R. Civ. P. 11
now requires that the brief be objectively reasonable").
24 Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 1986).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 832 n.10 (hypothetical example). Cf. In re Itel Securities Litig., 791 F.2d 672
(9th Cir. 1986)(upholding sanctions for attorney's "bad faith" course of conduct to secure
fee-related concessions).
" Cohen v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986).
28 Id.
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proceeding. 29 The phrase "other paper" has been liberally interpreted to
include notices of appeal and appellate briefs so that Rule 11 violations
may also occur in appellate court. 0
Rule 11 sanctions are apparently not available for actions taken in a
state court prior to removal, but do apply to proceedings following
removal. 31
In the event an attorney fails to sign a pleading, the literal language of
Rule 11 indicates that the appropriate sanction for a failure-to-sign
violation is to strike the pleading.32 In a case with facts bordering on the
ridiculous, the Ninth Circuit declined to decide whether or not monetary
sanctions are available for a failure-to-sign violation, but reached a
decision which could arguably be said to be a de facto rejection of the
district court's holding that monetary sanctions could be imposed for the
attorney's failure to sign a motion. 33
Without attempting to list every type of case where sanctions have
been imposed and for the purpose of illustrating the variety of situations
in which Rule 11 can be applied, it should be noted that Rule 11 sanctions
have been held appropriate by appellate courts in the following instances:
(1) against a plaintiff whose prefiling investigation was insufficient to
disclose that it named the wrong pharmaceutical manufacturer in a
products liability claim; 34 (2) against a debtor who brought a frivolous
motion to set aside an order approving a settlement agreement in a
bankruptcy proceeding;3 5 (3) against a taxpayer who frivolously peti-
tioned to quash an I.R.S. summons;36 (4) against a plaintiff who sued a
defendant without knowing precisely how the defendant fit into the
29 Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986) cert. denied Suffok Cty. v.
Grasek, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987)("Limiting the application of Rule 11 to testing the attorney's
conduct at the time a paper is signed is virtually mandated by the plain language of the
rule").
30 Thorton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 107 S. Ct. 181 (1986).
3 Brown v. Capitol Air, Inc., 797 F.2d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1986).
32 "If a pleading, motion or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant." FED.
R. Civ. P. 11.
33 Estate of Bias v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1986). In this case the plaintiffs
attorney inadvertently failed to sign a particular discovery motion, which was combined
with a supporting memorandum which he did sign. The motion was stricken, but it was
granted after it was refiled with a proper signature. Attorneys' fees on the discovery motion
were denied because the district court reasoned that the defendant could obtain Rule 11
sanctions for plaintiffs counsel's failure to sign the motion. When the plaintiff filed a
motion to reconsider this result, the district court imposed Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiff
for filing the motion to reconsider. The court of appeals reversed the Rule 11 sanctions as an
abuse of discretion without passing judgment on the rationale of the district court. Id. at
859-61.
Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986).
3 In re Ginther, 791 F.2d 1151. (5th Cir. 1986).
36 Stites v. I.R.S., 793 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1986).
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picture, hoping that later discovery would uncover something;37 (5) in
favor of a non-party deposition witness against the deposing party for
filing a groundless petition to hold the witness in contempt;3 8 (6) against
an attorney who filed objections to exact fee concessions;3 9 (7) for
repeating a frivolous argument on appeal;40 (8) against a plaintiff for
bringing a frivolous civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983;41 and
(9) against the movant on a 60(b) motion to set aside a judgment which
was brought as a delaying tactic.
42
C. Procedural Aspects
One who is sanctioned under Rule 11 is not necessarily entitled to a
hearing. The courts that have dealt specifically with this issue have
noted, consistent with the Advisory Committee Notes,43 that the trial
judge is a "primary participant in the proceedings" and has already had
the opportunity to have "observed those elements of the litigation most
relevant to the criteria for imposing sanctions."45 In appropriate circum-
stances however, due process could require a hearing.
46
A lawyer cannot avoid the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions by with-
drawing from his representation prior to the application for sanctions.47
Furthermore, the fact that the district court lacks jurisdiction to hear the
case does not preclude its authority to impose Rule 11 sanctions. 48
The imposition of sanctions is mandatory once a court finds a violation
of Rule 11.49 Selection of the type of sanction to be imposed lies within the
sound discretion of the district court.50 It may be reasonable expenses,
3 Southern Leasing Partners, Ltd. v McMullan, 801 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1986).
s Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
9 In re Itel Securities Litig., 791 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1986).
40 Barrios v. Pelham Marine, Inc., 796 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1986).
41 Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
42 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1985).
43 Rodgers, 771 F.2d at 205. The Court observed that since sanctions are no longer based
on subjective bad faith, a hearing is less likely to be required. Id. at 206.
44 McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
45 Id.
41 Id. See also MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986), where
on remand a hearing was directed for the sole purpose of litigating the reasonableness of the
attorneys' fees awarded. Cf. F.T.C. v. Alaska Land Leasing, Inc., 799 F.2d 507 (9th Cir.
1986)(reversing sanctions imposed under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for lack of adequate notice). For
a discussion of 28 U.S.C., § 1927, see infra text accompanying note 73.
47 In re Itel Securities Litig., 791 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1986).
48 Orange Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Frontline Ventures Ltd., 792 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir.
1986).
49 Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir. 1986); Zaldivar v City of Los
Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
" Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 802 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986).
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including attorneys' fees,5 1 partial expenses,5 2 a reprimand or published
opinion,5 3 or referral to a bar association grievance committee.5 4
Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed equally on the attorney and client5 5
or on either one.56 The court has, in at least one case, required that the
sanctions be imposed solely on the client, who was determined to have
been the "catalyst" for the frivolous motion.57
III. SECURING APPELLATE REVIEW
A. Reviewability
Appeal may be sought from the final judgment which fully disposes of
the underlying proceedings. 58 Sanctions against a non-party under Rule
11 are appealable as collateral orders when entered, 59 including sanc-
tions imposed solely against attorneys.60 It is not clear whether sanctions
imposed jointly against an attorney and a party, or a party alone, may be
immediately appealable. 6 1
B. Standard of Review
Generally speaking the review afforded to a district court's ruling on
Rule 11 sanctions has been an "abuse of discretion" standard by which
the trial court's decision is given deference except for abuse of discre-
tion.62 The Ninth Circuit has carefully delineated the standard of review
on Rule 11 cases as involving three distinct parts: (1) factual disputes are
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are
51 Id. (upholding a Rule 11 sanction of $294,141.10).
52 Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1986).
53 Id.
6 Id.
" E.g., Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 107 S. Ct. 181
(1986).
16 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 1985).
57 Id.
58 E.g., In re Itel Securities Litig., 791 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1986).
59 Frazier v. Cast, 771 F.2d 259, 262 (7th Cir. 1985).
60 Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535 (3rd Cir. 1985); Golden
Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986); Unioil, Inc. v. E. F.
Hutton & Co., 802 F.2d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 1986).
61 Frazier, 771 F.2d at 262, n.1.
62 Southern Leasing Partners, Ltd. v. McMullan, 801 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 1986);
Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1986); Stevens v. Lawyers Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th Cir. 1986); Cohen v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 788
F.2d 247, 248 (4th Cir. 1986); Davis v. Veslan Enter., 765 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 1985).
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reviewed de novo; and (3) the appropriateness of the sanction imposed is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.6 3
C. Relief
The following categories represent instances where the imposition of
Rule 11 sanctions was reversed by the appellate courts:
1. The Objective Criteria Satisfied
There are instances where the court of appeals just simply disagreed
with the district court's determination as to whether the attorney had an
objectively reasonable basis in law and in fact to proceed.64 Reversal of
sanctions has been further based on the additional consideration that to
do otherwise would "stifle the enthusiasm or chill the creativity that is
the very lifeblood of the law."65
2. Avoidance of the Wisdom of Hindsight
It has been held that a district court should not go so far as to "hold a
lawyer to a standard measured by what the judge later decides, but
should look at the situation which existed when the paper was filed."
66
The trial court should "avoid using the wisdom of hindsight" and confine
the analysis just to the signer's conduct at the time of submission of the
paper.6 7 Sanctions imposed by district courts which rely too heavily on
hindsight are subject to reversal.68
3. Analysis of Entire Pleading
It has been held that Rule 11 sanctions do not apply to the mere making
of a frivolous argument. The entire "pleading, motion or other paper"
' Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986); Golden Eagle
Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986).
" Stevens, 789 F.2d 1056.
65 Kamen, 791 F.2d at 1014.
6 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp., 801 F.2d at 1536.
17 Id. at 1537 (quoting Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983)).
6' Lacina v. G-K Trucking, 802 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1986) vacated 107 S. Ct. 3224 (1987);
Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1985); Frazier v.
Cast, 771 F.2d 259, 266 (7th Cir. 1985)(Flaum J., concurring).
The prohibition against using the wisdom of hindsight has been invoked to uphold a
sanction against an attorney who in his original motion to intervene failed to include
federal law claims, but did so much later when it appeared as though the state law claims
were going to be foreclosed by other action. Pin v. Texaco, Inc., 793 F.2d 1448 (5th Cir.
1986). Reasoning that the court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight, counsel's
conduct was measured by the reasonableness of the action at the time the pleading was
submitted. Id. at 1455-56.
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must itself be frivolous. Sanctions are not appropriate just because one of
the arguments or subarguments in support of it is frivolous.6 9
4. Unclean Hands
Although not designated as an "unclean hands" doctrine, both the
Second Circuit 70 and the Ninth Circuit 71 have clearly indicated that Rule
11 sanctions are inappropriate where the opposing party had engaged in
delaying tactics or other misconduct.
IV. OTHER SANCTIONS
This manuscript is confined only to the discussion of Rule 11 as
amended in 1983. There are numerous attorneys' fee shifting statutes
and exceptions now generally applicable in federal court and not dis-
cussed herein.72
Of particular interest and closely related to Rule 11 sanctions is the
statutory provision found in 28 U.S.C. § 1927. This is similar to Rule 11
in that it authorizes sanctions against an attorney, but is basically
limited to conduct which deals with a multiplication of proceedings, not
initial pleadings. 73
It should be noted that the appellate courts have found additional
authority in both the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and in statute
to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals.7 4
V. ETHICAL CONSImERATIONS
Rule 11 has developed separate and apart from the ethical rules of
conduct. Generally speaking the courts of appeals cases analyzed discuss
the ethical rules of conduct very little. It has been observed that the
" Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540-41 n.4 (9th Cir.
1986).
70 Woodcrest Nursing Home v. Local 144, Hotel, Hosp., Nursing Home and Allied Serv.
Union 788 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1986)(the opposing party engaged in conduct designed to delay
proceedings and also obtained repeated ex parte orders despite requests to be advised of
applications for relief.) See also Brown v. Capitol Air, Inc. 797 F.2d 106, 108 (2nd Cir. 1986)
(the opposing party increased litigation costs for everyone, including the courts, by
bifurcating a unitary claim through partial removal).
71 Mossman v. Roadway Express, Inc., 789 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1986)(opposing party
caused discovery fracas by pleading thirty-seven separate affirmative defenses).
7" For a discussion of fee shifting statutes and exceptions, see Starr, The Shifting
Panorama of Attorneys' Fees Award: The Expansion of Fee Recoveries in Federal Court, 28
S. TEx. L. REV. 189 (1986).
" For a comparison of Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see Zaldivar v. City of Los
Angeles, 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
7" FED. R. APP. P. 38; 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Sweeney Corp., 792
F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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inappropriate imposition of sanctions by a district court may create a
conflict with a lawyer's duty zealously to represent his client.75 In the
same case, an effort by the district court to enforce the ethical rule
relating to the duty of candor in connection with a Rule 11 sanctions was
reversed. 76 Nevertheless, there is an ever-present relationship between
Rule 11 and the ethical rules of conduct, 77 and, if appropriate, a Rule 11
sanction may take the form of a referral to a bar association grievance
committee.78
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, there was some concern as to
whether or not the Federal Rules had adequate provisions to insure the
truthfulness of allegations in pleadings and motions.7 9 With the 1983
incorporation of an objective standard of reasonableness, subjective good
faith was eliminated as a defense. Whether anticipated or not, the federal
courts have now become flooded with litigation concerning the new Rule
11. As initially posed, certain differences do exist among the circuits;
however the differences are relatively minor, relating primarily to each
circuit's description of the conduct which violates the relevant standards
and to the standard of review to be exerted by the appellate courts. There
is uniformity in the application of the objective nature of the standard of
reasonableness and a uniform recognition that deserved sanctions will be
upheld and increased, if appropriate, for frivolous appeals. Additionally,
the appellate courts have recognized areas where a district court may
overstep its limits by relying too heavily on a hindsight analysis or by
otherwise failing properly to apply the objective standard to the paper at
the time it was filed.
An argument can easily be made that the broad scope of sanctions now
authorized by Rule 11 is self-defeating because it has led to "protracted
and expensive satellite litigation over the appropriateness of sanc-
tions. 's0 Although this argument has merit, its usefulness appears to be
" Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th Cir. 1986).
76 Id. at 1539, 1542.
77 Id. at 1539 n. 2.
78 Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 158 (3rd Cir. 1986).
" Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976).
"0 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Advisory Committee's concern that courts will be besieged with motions to impose
sanctions against attorneys who make frivolous motions for sanctions)(citing Advisory
Committee Notes, 101 F.R.D. 161, 200 (1984)). See also Id. at 1541 (relying on Rosenberg,
The Federal Civil Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243, 244 (1984)).
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
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limited only to a case-by-case analysis, and it is highly unlikely that it
will serve as a broad-scale rejection of the new standard. 81 It uniformly
appears as though the federal courts have not only been receptive to the
new Rule 11, but they are all stepping on board the Rule 11 bandwagon
to sanction frivolous filings.
81 Id. at 1531.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss2/5
